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OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH, by and through
its ROAD COMMISSION,
Plaintiff and
Appellant,
vs.
JOHN E. PAPANIKOLAS, GUSE.
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INVESTMENT AND DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, a partnership,
Defendants,
Respondents and
Cross-Appellants
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10,657

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
REPLY TO POINT II OF
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF
The gist of respondents' argument respecting
Items 9, 11, 13, 17, 20, 22 and 29 appears to be twofold, i.e. ( 1) that such items are fixtures because
of their annexation and adaptation to the realty or
(2) that such items are fixtures, not by actual annexation to the realty but by constructive annexation.
As to ( 1) above, that matter has already been
covered in Appellant's Brief and nothing more need
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be said here. As to ( 2) above, we recognize that the
doctrine of constructive annexation has been applied
in other jurisdictions in specific condemnation actions as shown by the cases cited in Respond en ts'
Brief, and it appears that such is the majority rule.
109 A.L.R. 1424. However, we can find no Utah
condemnation case where it has been applied in this
State. The question becomes one of whether constructive annexation should apply in Utah and, if
so, to what extent.
There is a wide spectrum between items such
as movable hand tools and equipment on the one
hand and immovable machinery on the other, all of
which could under appropriate circumstances be
considered as integrated into a synchronized system
necessary to function as a unit. And within the extremes there are and will be border-line cases of
items where the degree of annexation and the extent
of integration into the system varies and gives the
items the dual aspects of personalty and fixtures
constructively annexed. Likewise the problem becomes even more perplexing where, as here, parts
of the items themselves are readily movable and in
fact were removed from the property taken. The
more difficult question becomes one of where do we
draw the line?
The application of the doctrine of constructive
annexation urged by respondents would make fixtures of all items between the above extremes and
would create a "carte blanche" for the landowner
2

to receive compensation for items of personal property which, although an integral part of the operation conducted on the real property, could be removed
without damage to the item or to the real property.
Yet it is settled law in this jurisdiction that Sectimi
7 8-3 4-1 0 ( 1) does not allow com pens a ti on for personal property situated upon the real property
taken. Utah Road Commission v. Hansen, 14 Utah
(2d) 305, 383 Pac. (2d) 917 ( 1963). Likewise in
those jurisdictions, such as Utah, which allow no
recovery for the cost of removing personal property
the1·e is no liability for machinery or other fixtures
attached only by screws or which can otherwise be
readily removed. Nichols on Eminent Domain, Volume 2, Section 5.83 p. 328. And it has lileen held that
such items as tools, equipment and raw materials
and supplies which were not annexed to the real property were not fixtures, even though such items were
of little value for use elsewhere. People v. Johnsmi
& Co., 219 N.Y.S. 741 (1927), affirmed 157 N.E.
885 (New York, 1927). In the case of City of Los
Angeles v. Siegel, 41 Cal. Rptr. 563, 230 Cal. App.
(2d) 980 (Calif., 1964) the California court refused to apply the doctrine of constructive annexation and affirmed a lower court holding that certain
items were not fixtures merely because they were
essential and integral to the business conducted on
the real property and when separated from the operation were rendered second-hand and greatly reduced in value.
3

And so, we urge that the better test still is whether the mode of annexation is such that removal of
the item will cause substantial damage to the item
itself and to the realty to which it is attached. Here
the trial court found in effect that the items removed could be removed without substantial damage to the item itself or to the building to which it
was attached (R. 41, 72). That being so, the trial
court erred in awarding defendants judgment for
any amount as to any of those items so removed by
defendants.
REPLY TO POINT III OF
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF
Point III of Respondents' Brief is devoted to a
cross appeal from the judgment of the trial court
disallowing any severance damage for those items
set forth in Exhibit "D" (R. 58, 59) located on the
remainder of defendants' property not taken. The
trial court found that all of such items were fixtures ( R. 73, 74) but
"9. That any damage to the items described in Finding No. 6 hereinabove resulting from the condemnation of that portion of
defendants' premises taken by plaintiff herein is so indefinite and speculative as to the
nature, extent and amount thereof, if any,
that the court finds no damage to any and all
of said iterns." ( R. 74)
The trial court then concluded
"4. That the law does not specifically
provide for compensation for damages to fix4

tures not taken in condemnation, and in any
event defendants are not entitled to any compensation for damages to the fixtures described in Finding Of Fact No. 6 herein because
such damages, if any, are so indefinite and
speculative as to the nature, extent and
amount thereof that the court concludes that
no damages should be allowed or awarded to
defendants therefor." (R. 75)
Thus, the issue on this appeal boils down to ( 1)
whether severance damages to fixtures are compensable in Utah and ( 2) whether there is any reasonable basis, either because of lack of evidence or
from the evidence and the fair inferences derived
therefrom, to sustain the refusal of the trial court
to award any severance damages to the fixtures not
taken.
As to ( 1) above, we note that the nature and
extent of compensation allowed in eminent domain
proceedings is purely statutory and if not expressly
allowed by statute it is non-compensable since this
court has held that Article I, Section 22 of the Utah
Constitittion is not self executing and applies only to
the extent that the enabling legislation carries it.
Fairclough v. Salt Lake County, 10 Utah (2d) 417,
354 Pac. (2d) 105 (1960). And so we must look to
Section 78-34-10, Utah Code Annotated 1953, which
limits compensation to those elements expressly enumerated therein.
" ( 1) The value of the property sought
to be condemned and all improvements thereon appertaining to the realty, and of each and
5

every separate estate or interest therein; and
if it consists of different parcels, the value
of each parcel and of each estate or interest
therein shall be separately assessed.
" ( 2) If the property sought to be condemned constitutes only a part of a larger
parcel, the damages which will accrue to the
portion not sought to be condemned by reason
of its severance from the portion sought to be
condemned and the construction of the improvement in the manner proposed by the
plaintiff."
We note that subsection ( 1) speaks in terms of
property and improvements thereon appertaining
to the realty as being compensable. Thus for fixtures to be compensable as a part of the "take"
such must be encompassed in the description of "improvements thereon appertaining to the realty."
However, subsection (2) omits any reference to improvements and, of course, does not mention fixtures. It speaks only in terms of damages accruing
to the portion of the property not sought to be
condemned resulting from the partial taking.
In spite of the above, damages to improvements
on the remaining lands not taken have been held to
be compensable. State v. Ward, 112 Utah 452, 189
Pac. ( 2d) 113 ( 1948). Yet in State Road Commission v. Hansen, 14 Utah (2d) 305, 383 Pac. (2d)
917 ( 1963) this court noted that the statute speaks
in terms of real property and contains no express
wording construable as allowing recovery for personal property. The rationale of the case construes
6

the statute as limiting compensation to those interests expressly provided for therein. Thus, section
78-34-10(2), Utah Code Annotated 1953 omits all
reference to improvements, and this we believe is
what the trial court had in mind in reaching its conclusion that the law does not specifically provide for
compensation for damages to fixtures not taken in
condemnation. Accordingly, we ask this court for a
clarification thereof.
As to ( 2) above, the trial court found and concluded that any damages to the remaining fixtures
not taken were so indefinite and speculative as to
the nature, extent and amount thereof, if any, that
there was no damage ( R. 74) and none should be
awarded (R. 75). The issue then on this appeal is
whether there is any reasonable basis, either because of lack of evidence or from the evidence and
the fair inferences derived therefrom taken in the
light most favorable to plaintiff, to sustain the refusal of the trial court to award any severance damages to the fixtures not taken. Ray v. Consolidated
Freightways, 4 Utah (2d) 137, 289 Pac. (2d) 196
( 1955). Defendants seem to make much of the fact
that plaintiff did not offer conflicting evidence to
dispute the claimed severance damages to the fixtures itemized on Exhibit "D" (R. 58, 59). The
answer to that is that it was defendants' burden to
prove not only that such fixtures had been damaged
but the amount thereof, and plaintiff, being satisfied that such burden had not been met, chose not
7

to offer any evidence thereon. Thus, the fact that
the plaintiff did not come forth with conflicting
evidence is of no help to the defendants when they
failed to establish in the mind of the fact trier a
prim a f acie case on severance damages.
In the cases of Malstrom, v. Consolidated Theatres, 4 Utah (2d) 181, 290 Pac. (2d) 689 (1955)
and Ray v. Consolidated Freightways, 4 Utah (2d)
137, 289 Pac. 196 ( 1955) this court held that the
ref us al of the trial court to find as one party requests does not have to be supported by substantial
evidence, but on the contrary such refusal to so find
can be based upon a lack of evidence. In the Ray
case, supra, it was noted on page 144 of the Utah
Reports that:
"It would only be when such refusal did
such violence to common sense as to convince
the court that no fact trier, acting fairly and
reasonably, would refuse to make such finding, that it would be reversed."
And in the Malstrorn case, supra, it was pointed out
on page 185 of the Utah Reports that the only circumstance under which this court would be warranted in overturning the trial court's determination would be if the evidence were such that no reasonable person could remain unconvinced of the
establishment of that determinative fact.
As to Items 32 to 41, inclusive, itemized on Exhibit "D" (R. 58, 59), defendants were put to their
proof that such items had been damaged and the
8

extent thereof (Tr. 3). The measure of damage, if
any, would be the difference in the fair market
value before and after the taking (Stipulation, par.
4(2), R. 63). As to Items 34, 37, 39 and 40 plaintiff agreed on the cost of relocation if the court determined such were fixtures and had been damaged
(Tr. 3, 4, 5), but plaintiff did not agree that such
was the amount of severance damage as stated on
page 22 of Respondents' Brief.
Thus, defendants had the burden of proving
that the remaining fixtures had been damaged to a
reasonably ascertainable extent and in a manner
compensable by law. Defendants failed in both respects, and the trial court so found.
In Nichols On Eminent Domain, Volume 4, Section 14.21 (2), page 51.9, the general rule is stated
as follows:
"The burden of proof is upon the owner
to show that the taking of part of his property
will cause damage to the remainder, and unless he shows such damage by affirmative
evidence, furnishing a basis from which a
reasonable and proper estimate of the amount
thereof can be made, his compensation will
be limited to the value of the land taken .... "
And in 27 Am. Jur. (2d), Section 310, it is stated on page 126:
"The injury to the remaining land must
be sufficiently definite to be of practical importance, and to enter into the present market
9

value; if it is remote and speculative, it cannot be considered. . . "
It was incumbent upon defendants to prove the
fair market value of each item before and after the
taking (R. 63, Tr. 3), first to prove that such items
had in fact been damaged and second to prove the
amount thereof. Plaintiff agreed to the reasonable
cost of relocation of Items 34, 37, 39 and 40 which
the court could consider if it found that those items
had been damaged (Tr. 3, 4). A cursory examination of the Record shows that the trial court was
justified in finding that the defendants had failed
in sustaining their burden.
The most obvious defect is that Items 34, 37,
39 and 40 were not given a fair market value by any
of the defendants' witnesses. The defendants merely
submitted the cost of relocation of each item as
stipulated to by the parties. As to those items, the
only evidence to establish their market value was
the cost of relocation, which was insufficient to
sustain defendants' burden on those items. In the
case of City of La Mesa v. Tweed And Gambrell
Planing Mill, 304 Pac. (2d) 803 (Calif. 1956) the
California court, in considering testimony as to the
cost of relocation of certain machinery and electric
and blower systems for a part of the landowner's
planing mill not included in the "take", stated on
page 812 of the Pacific Reporter:
"The cost of removing or relocating such
equipment is not reasonably related to its
10

value as part of the premises involved. Such
a cost is not a compensable item recoverable
as part of the award for land taken on account of severance damage."
And in the Utah case of State v. Ward, 112
Utah 452, 189 Pac. (2d) 113 (1948) this court, in
discussing the approach to be used in ascertaining
severance damages under subsection ( 2) of Section
78-34-10, Utah Code Annotated 1953, noted that the
replacement or restoration cost in lieu of damages
should not be applied to subsection ( 2), but rather
that the correct measure of damages was embodied
in the Instruction of the lower court set forth on
page 116 of the Pacific Reporter as follows:
" ... That uncertain, remote, speculative
or imaginary elements of damage should not
be considered, but only elements which are
appreciable and substantial and actually lessen the market value, and that the damages
to remaining property must be limited to the
difference in market value before and after
condernnati on.''
This court then cited with approval the case of Coos
Bay Logging Company v. Barclay, 159 Oregon 272,
70 Pac. (2d) 672, 679 with reference to the cost of
moving a house back and away from the expanded
right-of-way as being too remote as a basis for compensation. And so, under the authorities, it is clear
that as to the items enumerated above defendants
failed to prove that such items had been damaged
by the diminution in the fair market value thereof
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and, accordingly, the trial court properly refused
to award any severance damage therefor.
As to the remaining items, the Record falls far
short of the requirement that no reasonable fact
finder could remain unconvinced that defendants
had proved the diminution of market value of each
particular item as the result of the "take". In attempting to establish severance damage the landowner must show more than the value of the property to him, since we are dealing with a situation
where the property has not been taken nor has it
suffered any physical injury. In the case of C01nmonwealth v. Stamper, 345 S.W. (2d) 640 (Kentucky) the court laid down what we believe to be the
desirable rule: That the evidence of factors bearing
upon diminution of value should be addressed to
how they will affect market value and not how they
will hurt the owner or make less advantageous the
use of the property for his particular purposes or
to correct conditions which he would like to remedy.
An examination of the transcript in this case
shows that defendants' expert witness Glassey readily gave opinions as to the before and after values
of the items in question, but failed to set forth the
factors which entered into such opinions. Likewise,
his estimates of the before values were based upon
the cost of construction less an assumed accrued depreciation to March 22, 1963. Yet he was uncertain
as to when the items had been constructed or how
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long they had been in place. He put a before value
on Item 32 of $900.00 (Tr. 71) yet defendants valued it at $800.00 (R. 58). He consistently used a
flat depreciation of 25 %, repeatedly stating that
the life of the item had been about one fourth used,
without further explanation. He put an after value
of $400.00 on the monorail and hoist (Item 41)
without knowing whether it was still operable or
not. Yet he admitted that such fact would be important in its resale value (Tr. 84). And he was uncertain as to whether it was power operated (Tr.
83, 85). This was typical of his whole testimony,
and the trial court obviously had grave doubts as to
the credibility thereof. And it must be remembered
that the trial court viewed the premises and saw for
itself the remaining items in question (Tr. 139,
140).
The Record indicates a dearth of facts underpinning the opinions of value give by Mr. Glassey,
although he did state that some of the items were
custom-made and could not readily be purchased on
the open market. However, the defendants failed to
show whether or not these items could have been
used had they so wished to make use of them. The
testimony of Mr. Glassey seems to be based upon
the presumption that the items in question were
completely worthless to the defendants and could
not have been put to use even with an additional expenditure of money on the portion not taken. In attempting to establish the fair market value after
13

the taking, the mere fact that an expert states as his
opinion that the items have no value is not binding
upon the finder of fact who in his discretion may
weigh such testimony in light of the factors upon
which such opinion is based, his view of the premises, the qualifications and interest of the witness
and the general reliability of such testimony.
On the basis of the evidence submitted, the trial
court concluded that defendants had failed to prove
severance damages to the remaining fixtures by a
preponderance of the evidence. Likewise, it concluded from the evidence that such damages, if any,
were too indefinite and speculative. The Record falls
far short of the requirement that the trial court's
refusal to find severance damages would do such
violence to common sense so as to convince this court
that no fact trier acting fairly and reasonably would
refuse to make such finding. That being so, under
the time honored rule the finding of the trial court
cannot be disturbed. Ray v. Consolidated Freightways, 4 Utah (2d) 137, 289 Pac. (2d) 196 ( 1955).
We respectfully submit that the judgment of
the trial court in its refusal to award severance
damages to the remaining fixtures not taken should
be affirmed. And for the reasons hereinabove stated
and those set forth in Appellant's Brief we respect-
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fully submit that the judgment of the trial court
must be modified to reduce the amount of the award
by the sum of $2,542.00, being the net amount
awarded to defendants for the seven items about
which plaintiff complains.
Respectfully submitted,
PHIL L. HANSEN
Attorney General
State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
JOSEPH NOV AK
Special Assistant
Attorney General
520 Continental Bank Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for
Plaintiff and Appellant
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